DIFFICULT G5 SAHEL IMPLEMENTATION ... The countries of the Sahel today face multifaceted security challenges. These security challenges can range from the porosity of borders, the upsurge of Islamo-terrorism, organized crime, the taking of hostages with ransoms, the resurgence of independence or autonomy movements, attacks against national armies, drought, deteriorating climate, starvation, poverty, inability of national armies to provide security over vast territories, poverty, elitist corruption, underdevelopment ... .. Fort of all these security challenges seriously and dangerously compromising the security of the Sahel States, that five Sahel States will particularly set up an Organization called the G5 Sahel.

Difficult G5 Sahel Implementation

Indeed, the G5 Sahel is an intergovernmental cooperation organization comprising five Sahel States, namely: Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad. It was created on February 16, 2014 under the leadership of the Mauritanian presidency of the African Union. It therefore aims to be both a military, political and developmental response in order to provide regional responses to regional or even transnational or transcontinental security challenges.

But it is clear that, since its creation, it is still in its primary phase of infancy and gestation. It therefore struggles to be fully operational for lack of a UN mandate but also and above all the enormous lack of its funding. It is in this very difficult context that the G5 Sahel struggles to be truly an effective Organization. Especially since the five states that make up the G5 Sahel are bankrupt states and are aware of all the difficulties in the world in being able to ensure the security of people and their property in their respective territories. Without counting the fact that which States are almost deprived of significant financial resources in order to take charge as it should the G5 Sahel within the framework of its full operationalization.

It is in this vein that the five heads of state of the G5 Sahel met in Niamey in Niger. This meeting had a double objective. On the one hand, give condolences to the entire Nigerien people and to the families of the soldiers in particular following the deadly attack on the military camp of Inates. On the other hand, to debate on the deep questions which taint the operational implementation of the G5 Sahel in particular the financial resources during the summit of Pau which will take place on Monday January 13, 2020 under the effective presidency of the French President Emmanuel Macron. Thus, during the extraordinary summit held in Niamey on December 15, 2019, the final communiqué of the said summit was made public. In point 19 of the final press release, the heads of state of the G5 Sahel expressed the wish to be able to benefit from substantial financial assistance, like the type of the Marshall plan intervened after the Second World War in the reconstruction of European states. thus devastated by the war.

So therefore, in view of the European context and that of the Sahel, the question, or at least, the questions which are necessary are these. Are the two contexts the same? Wouldn't the Sahel Marshall Plan mean a hijacking of it by the rulers? Would foreign financial aid be the best answer for the operationalization of the G5 Sahel?

Indeed, from 1948 to 1952, the United States of America transferred more than 13 billion dollars is the equivalent of 1000 billion dollars today for the reconstruction of Europe after the second world war . The Marshall Plan was a resounding success at that time, especially since it will contribute to the re-establishment of Political and Social Institutions and for the present peace and prosperity that we recognize in Europe today. And the G5 Sahel heads of state are inspired by this Marshall plan in order to benefit from the same type of plan as part of the effective implementation of the G5 Sahel. But these are two very different realities. To present the positive results of the Marshal plan as a promise of similar achievements in the context of the G5 Sahel would be to be mistaken because the European Marshall Plan cannot be transposed to the context of the G5 Sahel. So here are the reasons.

Unlike the G5 Sahel states, European nations were not totally dependent on aid. Despite the ravages of war, Europe's economic renaissance was already underway. The continent had other resources to its credit. At its peak, the flows of the Marshall Plan represented only 2.5% of the GNP of the main beneficiary countries like France and Germany. Africa in general and the Sahel states in particular have long been overwhelmed by aid. Africa today receives development assistance equivalent to 15% of its GNP, more than four times the Marshall Plan at its peak. Given the floods of billions that have been poured out by official development assistance over the past 60 years and given the poor performance, it is hard to imagine that the Marshall plan of the Sahelian type can really be the panacea to the problems of the efficiency of the G5 Sahel.

In addition, the Marshall Plan had a limited duration. The United States of America set a target. And European countries accepted this goal. This objective was duration. And she was only 5 years old. In contrast, Africa in general and the Sahel states in particular have received uninterrupted aid for at least almost 60 years. Thus, in the absence of any explicit threat of interruption of aid, the Sahel States are led to consider aid as a permanent source. And as such, they have no desire to establish long-term endogenous financial plans insofar as they quietly cash the generous checks of official development assistance.

In addition, the European nations, despite their destruction in the aftermath of the Second World War, had provided themselves before the war with solid and efficient institutions such as an efficient public and judicial administration, good business management, a well-formed republican army, well equipped and well experienced. So the Marshall Plan was less aid for economic development than aid for reconstruction. And the difference between the two is abysmal. Building and not rebuilding Political, Military, Social and Economic Institutions requires much more than money.

This is why, unlike the Sahel States, the aid provided by the Marshall Plan mainly targeted physical infrastructure. But in the case of the G5 Sahel, this aid intends to cover essentially sovereign missions of the State such as the civil service, the army, public health, education or, in short, Political Institutions.

All in all, and despite the fact that the rich countries have transferred to Africa since the 1940s by way of public aid more than 1000 billion dollars, and that represents roughly 1000 dollars per inhabitant of the planet, yes, we have plenty of time to maintain that this aid does not work, in particular for the French-speaking States of Africa and particularly for the Sahelian States. On the strength of this unfortunate observation that the legendary Rwandan President Paul Kagame did not support the most likely thesis which is that: 《whatever one has spent, apparently more than 300 billion dollars in aid on our continent since 1970, the economic and human results are almost nil》.

Having thus briefly but substantially dealt with the incompatibility of the Marshal plan intervened in Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War and its possible inspiration within the framework of the G5 Sahel by the five heads of state of which Organization on the occasion of the summit which will take place on January 13 in Pau, France, we will quickly but subsequently outline the limited mandate of the G5 Sahel.

Moreover, on February 6, 2017, the G5 Sahel heads of state launched from Bamako the Malian capital the joint force of the G5 Sahel whose objective is 《to ensure effective, efficient and permanent control in the common space, and thus meet the security challenges and create the conditions for peace and development》. Almost 3 years later, timid advances have been recorded in the materialization of the joint force of the G5 Sahel. But it must be admitted that immense difficulties remain. The main among them is the failure to obtain a resolution from the United Nations Security Council guaranteeing both its funding and giving it a mandate to act throughout the Sahel in accordance with chapter 7 of the UN charter.

Without the UN mandate, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for the joint force of the G5 Sahel to be an aggressive and fully effective force. We must bear in mind that the Sahel is not simply reduced to the five states that make up the G5 Sahel. On the contrary, starting from the definition given by the Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel, the Sahel would be made up of a dozen countries. And the security challenges identified in almost the entire Sahel are almost identical to those of the five states forming the G5 Sahel. And in view, in recent times, of terrorist attacks against national armies, it should be noted that without a UN mandate, the G5 Sahel will experience serious difficulties in its effective implementation and even its existence proper. However, it should be noted that the fact that some G5 Sahel states will inevitably divert the possible UN mandate from its original objective, that of combating terrorism.

Within the framework of a UN mandate for the G5 Sahel, there will be a serious danger. Because the fight against terrorism will be invoked to adopt measures intended to restrict public, or at least fundamental, freedoms, to muzzle political and social opposition. But above all to redirect the mandate against certain rebel groups or certain autonomist or independence groups. All the more so since certain G5 Sahel states face politico-military movements like Chad or certain independence groups like Mali.

Some sketches of solutions

If ever a possible UN mandate is granted to the G5 Sahel as part of its mission to fight terrorism, we demand that which mandate applies within the framework of the rule of law, respect for the principles of international law and provisions of international human rights law and international humanitarian law.

More concretely it is necessary:

1) The creation and effective establishment of a monitoring and evaluation committee with regard to the financial assistance devoted to the G5 Sahel;

2) Set a deadline for the financial assistance granted to the G5 Sahel;

3) Demand concrete responses to the G5 Sahel in the context of the aid received;

4) Republicanize the national armies;

5) Empower the G5 Sahel by creating an endogenous funding mechanism;

6) Reform the security sector;

7) Integrate security into the overall democratic and developmental governance of the G5 Sahel countries;

8) Develop security governance based on human security and a culture of prevention;

9) Develop national legislation to fight organized crime in line with threats, consistent and harmonized;

10) Effective and efficient securing of borders;

11) Moralize the security services;

12) Fight against corruption;

13) Promote the whistle-blowing regime for organized crime;

14) Revalue the intelligence services;

15) Moralize political life;

16) Involve traditional, customary and religious authorities;

17) Harmonize institutional control mechanisms;

18) Favor and strengthen bilateral, trilateral and multilateral cooperation.